Security● Implemented
Encryption in transit
Application traffic uses TLS; live audio and video use WebRTC DTLS-SRTP.
Control detail
HSTS is applied at the application edge. Media encryption is provided by the WebRTC transport between participants and the managed media infrastructure.
PUBLIC EVIDENCEHSTS application headerWebRTC encrypted media transport
Security● Implemented
Tenant data isolation
Customer tables use Postgres Row-Level Security and privileged server routes perform explicit authorization checks.
Control detail
Event, attendee and reporting data is owner-scoped. Some server workloads require a service credential and therefore enforce ownership at the route boundary rather than relying on RLS alone.
PUBLIC EVIDENCEOwner-scoped database policiesRoute-level ownership checks
Security● Implemented
Private recording storage
Recording objects are private, browser reads use short-lived links, and anonymous arbitrary-path uploads are blocked.
Control detail
Anonymous guest backup uploads use a room-token-verified, single-object capability. Direct browser INSERT access is restricted to authenticated owners, admins, producers and hosts.
PUBLIC EVIDENCEPrivate storage bucketRoom-bound signed upload capabilityAuthenticated host INSERT policy
Security● Implemented
Managed authentication and invite gate
Authentication is provided by Supabase Auth, with password and Google sign-in paths subject to the same host-account gate.
Control detail
Uninvited identities do not receive a host profile. Flarea does not receive or store a user’s plaintext password.
PUBLIC EVIDENCEServer-side host profile gateManaged identity provider
Security● Implemented
Administrative authorization trail
System-administration requests produce a minimal, access-restricted authorization record with a 400-day retention rule.
Control detail
The trail records actor identifier, method/path, outcome and request ID. It deliberately excludes bearer tokens, request bodies, email addresses and IP addresses.
PUBLIC EVIDENCECentral admin request gateRLS-locked audit tableDatabase-enforced retention schedule
Security● Implemented
Hash-only platform API credentials
Platform API keys are high-entropy, scoped, expiring and stored only as cryptographic hashes after one-time display.
Control detail
Keys can be revoked immediately. Authentication and rate-limit identity use the hash rather than retaining recoverable bearer material.
PUBLIC EVIDENCEOne-time key displayHash-only credential storageExplicit scopes, expiry and revocation
Privacy● Implemented
Payment-data minimization
Stripe hosts checkout and billing-management surfaces; Flarea does not store card numbers.
Control detail
The application retains billing references, subscription state and usage records needed to operate paid plans. Payment credentials remain with Stripe.
PUBLIC EVIDENCEHosted checkout and billing portalNo card-number storage in Flarea
Privacy● Implemented
Email suppression and sender controls
Platform email includes sender context, RFC 8058 one-click opt-out and signed visible unsubscribe paths backed by suppression.
Control detail
Host workflows cannot bypass global suppression. Onboarding has a scoped opt-out, physical sender identification ships in both footer formats, and mailbox-provider POST requests use the same signed capability.
PUBLIC EVIDENCERFC 8058 one-click headersSigned unsubscribe tokenGlobal and scoped suppressionSender identification
Reliability● Implemented
Health monitoring and critical alerting
A deep health endpoint, external watchdog and grouped operational-event alerts monitor the application plane.
Control detail
The watchdog runs outside the Vercel application plane and records failures and recoveries. Central long-term log retention remains a separate in-progress control.
PUBLIC EVIDENCEDeep dependency health checksExternal five-minute watchdogDeduplicated critical alerts
Security◐ In progress
Dependency and secret scanning
Production dependencies are kept on reviewed lockfiles; continuous multi-scanner enforcement is being completed.
Control detail
Known production advisories are reviewed and remediated through point-in-time scans. Secret and source scanning are not represented here as standing controls until the private-repository workflows are checked in and verified.
PUBLIC EVIDENCELockfile-based dependency reviewPoint-in-time source and secret scans
Compliance◐ In progress
Secure change management
Automated tests and production builds are used before release; enforced branch protection and separation of duties remain open.
Control detail
The repository has broad automated coverage, but the current repository plan does not enforce all desired approval and required-check gates on the main branch.
PUBLIC EVIDENCEAutomated test suiteProduction build verification
Security● Implemented
Administrative MFA
System-administration routes and database policies require an AAL2 session; password-only admin access is denied.
Control detail
Administrative identities enroll and challenge a TOTP factor before entering the system-administration plane. Authorization is based on the canonical admin role plus AAL2, with no email fallback.
PUBLIC EVIDENCECentral AAL2 route gateAAL2-aware database policyTOTP enrollment and challenge
Compliance● Implemented
Documented incident response program
A named incident owner, severity model, response targets, escalation path and breach-handling procedure are documented.
Control detail
The program covers evidence preservation, narrow containment, tested release recovery, customer/regulatory notification ownership, post-incident review and scheduled exercises.
PUBLIC EVIDENCESeverity and response targetsContainment and recovery runbookPost-incident review requirement
Reliability◐ In progress
Backup and recovery assurance
Recording capture has redundant application paths; documented database restore testing remains incomplete.
Control detail
Live recording uses managed egress plus in-browser backup and recovery logic. A formal restore drill, recovery-time objective and recovery-point objective are not yet published controls.
PUBLIC EVIDENCEBrowser recording backupManaged recording egressRecovery assembly path
Privacy● Implemented
Recording consent evidence
On-stage publishers must affirm the recording notice before receiving a token, and Flarea stores pseudonymous timestamped evidence.
Control detail
The token boundary records event, participant role, notice version, lawful basis, first and latest confirmation timestamps and a confirmation count without storing the bearer token, email or IP.
PUBLIC EVIDENCEFail-closed publish-token boundaryPseudonymous timestamped consent ledgerPersistent recording indicator
Privacy● Implemented
Analytics consent defaults
Optional analytics is default-off and creates no visitor identifier until the visitor explicitly allows it.
Control detail
Do Not Track remains authoritative. Pre-consent events and identify data stay memory-only; every generated embed requires the host consent callback before transmission.
PUBLIC EVIDENCEDefault-deny analyticsNo pre-consent identifierExplicit allow/reject controls
Privacy◐ In progress
Retention and deletion lifecycle
Hosts can delete recordings and attendees can self-serve profile export/erasure; automatic retention enforcement is not active.
Control detail
The retention engine remains dry-run pending a cold-archive safety net. The public privacy policy states the current behavior instead of advertising automatic deletion that is not enabled.
PUBLIC EVIDENCEHost recording deletionAttendee self-service privacy controlsDocumented current retention posture
Compliance◐ In progress
Vendor and subprocessor governance
A canonical public subprocessor register is maintained; formal review records and DPA coverage are still being completed.
Control detail
The register identifies purpose, data categories and processing region. It does not imply that every vendor review or contract artifact is complete.
PUBLIC EVIDENCECanonical subprocessor registerPrivacy-policy parity test